Introduction and Conceptual Premise
For years, Venezuela has occupied a stable place in international geopolitical debate not only because of its current relevance, but because it reflects—often in amplified form—some of the key fractures of the contemporary global order. The crisis that has engulfed the country, culminating in the progressive collapse of its institutions and economic system, cannot be interpreted as a simple authoritarian deviation or as the contingent outcome of poor governance choices. Rather, it should be understood as the result of a long-term historical trajectory marked by state fragility, dependence on rent, and Venezuela’s role as a space onto which systemic conflicts have been projected—first bipolar, and today multipolar.
This contribution therefore aims to shift the analysis away from mere chronicle toward a historical and structural perspective, useful for understanding the transition from the postwar order to a more fragmented, competitive, and unstable international system. Within this framework, the trajectory leading from chavismo to the crisis of madurismo is not a regional exception, but a case study of state deterioration and the instrumentalization of both internal and external actors.
This interpretative lens is finally applied to a concrete case: the detention of Italian humanitarian worker Alberto Trentini, interpreted not as an isolated incident, but as an expression of the logics of control and suspicion typical of a radically degraded political context.
The Long Duration of the Venezuelan Crisis: A Weak State Between Rent and Dependence
To understand Venezuela’s contemporary crisis, it is necessary to situate it within the long-term history of its state formation. Since independence in the nineteenth century, the country has exhibited recurring institutional fragility, marked by caudillismo and the personalization of power, with the state often conceived more as a tool for resource distribution than as a stable regulatory apparatus. This weakness has shaped elite formation and political culture, fostering cycles of instability and delegitimation.
In the twentieth century, oil exploitation consolidated these dynamics: energy rent ensured only an apparent stability, enabling redistribution and consensus without developing a diversified economy or robust institutions. Venezuela thus became a classic “rentier state,” vulnerable to external shocks and prone to clientelism and corruption. In the absence of a solid productive base and an inclusive social pact, the current crisis emerges as the outcome of a structural trajectory of dependence and fragility, rather than as a sudden event.
Venezuela in the Bipolar World System: Apparent Stability and the Freezing of Contradictions
In the postwar context, Venezuela firmly aligned itself with the Western camp, benefiting from a privileged relationship with the United States based on energy security and shared anti-communist alignment. This positioning granted the country a degree of political stability—albeit ephemeral—and international legitimacy, reinforcing the image of a relatively solid democracy within the South American landscape. However, this stability was largely superficial.
Bipolarism, rather than resolving internal contradictions, effectively froze the status quo. Venezuelan elites, shielded by the prevailing geopolitical framework, had little incentive to pursue structural reforms or reduce dependence on oil rent. Representative democracy, though formally functional, remained fragile and incapable of addressing growing social inequalities. In this sense, Venezuela became a distorted mirror of the bipolar system itself: a peripheral country reflecting global logics of stabilization, but at the cost of an inexorable erosion of internal cohesion.
Chavismo: Symbolic Rupture and Structural Continuity
The rise of chavismo should be read as the outcome of the crisis of Venezuelan representative democracy that matured between the 1970s and 1990s. The Pacto de Puntofijo system (1958) guaranteed formal stability but fostered elite self-referentiality and clientelistic management of oil rent. With the collapse of oil prices, the debt crisis, and structural adjustment policies, the social compromise fractured; episodes of internal unrest, notably the Caracazo (1989), exposed the rift between society and institutions, delegitimizing the existing political order.
In this context, Hugo Chávez emerged as a charismatic response to demands for representation and refoundation. Chavismo combined nationalism, anti-oligarchic rhetoric, and plebiscitary appeals to popular sovereignty, but failed to overcome the country’s structural weaknesses: centrality of rent, personalization of power, and the role of the armed forces as a pillar of political order. Symbolic rupture and mass mobilization temporarily masked these contradictions, while centralization and militarization contributed to system rigidity. Internationally, the choice of an antagonistic stance toward the West and alliances with extra-Western actors reinforced internal legitimacy but increased Venezuela’s exposure to external pressures and economic shocks.
Maduro and the Implosion of a Worn System
Nicolás Maduro’s succession in 2013 marked the transition from a “charismatic” regime—almost entirely dependent on a strong leader capable of channeling popular discontent—to one based on coercion and repression. Lacking the symbolic capital and populist momentum of his predecessor, Maduro governed a country already deeply weakened on all fronts, facing collapsing oil prices, stringent international sanctions, and growing social disintegration.
Madurismo can be defined as a form of non-virtuous systemic continuity, intensified in its coercive dimensions and blind to mounting crises. The essential lesson is not merely political but conceptual: the crisis should not be seen as a sudden, spontaneous phenomenon without warning, but as a process of slow deterioration culminating in collapse.
Within the global landscape of contemporary dictatorships, Venezuela aligns with post-revolutionary or post-populist regimes that survive not through coherent ideological projects, but through the permanent management of crisis and rent. As in similar contexts, repression is selective rather than total, ideology is replaced by securitarian narratives, and internal and external enemies become tools of governance. In this sense, madurismo represents not an anomaly, but a typical form of twenty-first-century authoritarianism: fragile, obsessive, dependent on unstable international balances, and structurally inclined to use coercion as its primary political and administrative language.
Within such a framework, Maduro’s downfall—poised between implosion and overthrow—appears almost inevitable, the outcome of a historical trajectory marked by an inability to reform and adapt to a rapidly changing international context.
Venezuela in the Multipolar Order: Hybrid Practices and Total Securitization
In the current multipolar scenario, Venezuela has become a space of competition among regional and global actors, a “laboratory” for hybrid practices combining diplomacy, intelligence, information control, and repression. The Venezuelan crisis illustrates how, in contexts of state collapse, the distinction between domestic politics and international dynamics tends to dissolve.
Selective use of force, surveillance of information flows, and growing distrust toward external actors—including humanitarian organizations—are part of a logic of total securitization of power. In this context, OSINT and HUMINT become central tools not only for state actors, but also for understanding the fragmentation of territorial and social control.
The Case of Italian Humanitarian Worker Trentini in Its Systemic Reflection
The case of Italian humanitarian worker Alberto Trentini fits squarely within this framework. It cannot be interpreted as an isolated incident, but rather as an expression of the logic of suspicion and control characteristic of regimes in a phase of collapse. The presence of foreign humanitarian operators is perceived as a potential threat, a possible vector of external interference, or a negotiable resource.
In a scenario of increasing international isolation, the detention or pressure exerted on foreign citizens can serve a functional role, aimed at extracting political concessions or reinforcing internal narratives of power and status. For Italy and Europe, cases like this highlight the need for a more realistic assessment of the risks associated with cooperation in authoritarian and deeply unstable contexts.
Alberto Trentini arrived in Caracas on October 17, 2024, and was stopped at a checkpoint while traveling toward Guasdualito to deliver aid to local communities. He was subsequently arrested and detained for 423 days in a maximum-security prison near Caracas. His detention went through several phases—from an initial period of absolute isolation lasting 181 days without communication, to the first limited contacts and subsequent diplomatic efforts—until his release on January 12, 2026.
Within the broader scenario of instability leading to Maduro’s forced removal, the detention assumed a political role, as did the subsequent release, which occurred alongside the liberation of other individuals detained under Maduro’s government. The involuntary role of such foreign operators—instrumentalized between detention and release—can thus be understood as both political and representative of moments of division and, conversely, political détente.
The Venezuelan case offers significant lessons in political risk management and comparative geopolitical analysis. International cooperation cannot disregard a deep understanding of local contexts, power dynamics, and the survival strategies of regimes in crisis. The illusion of humanitarian neutrality, if not accompanied by adequate analytical and protective tools, risks exposing operators and institutions to significant vulnerabilities.
For Europe, Venezuela stands as a warning of the need to integrate intelligence, historical analysis, and strategic assessment into foreign policy, moving beyond fragmented and reactive approaches.
Conclusion
Far from being a regional anomaly, Venezuela emerges as a mirror of the profound transformations of the international order. Its crisis reflects the transition from bipolarism to an unstable multipolar world, in which fragile states become arenas of competition and political experimentation. The trajectory leading to Chávez and Maduro, as well as the case of humanitarian worker Alberto Trentini, demonstrates how long-term historical dynamics continue to exert decisive influence on the present. Ultimately, understanding Venezuela means understanding some of the structural vulnerabilities of the contemporary global system.
Sources
For an in-depth analysis of arbitrary detention and the Trentini case, see the article published in Kriptia Magazine: https://www.kriptia.com/il-caso-trentini-e-la-detenzione-arbitraria-implicazioni-per-la-travel-security-nei-paesi-ad-alto-rischio/
https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/1098501.pdf
https://romatrepress.uniroma3.it/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/06.Venezuela-e-guerra-ibrida-Celano.pdf
https://www.orizzontipolitici.it/i-dittatori-di-oggi-nicolas-maduro/
https://www.limesonline.com/limesplus/storia-del-collasso-del-venezuela-14703931
Massimiliano Spiga, Ph.D. is an Intelligence Analyst at Kriptia. He also serves as Director of the Scientific and Cultural Committee and as Coordinator of the Observatory on Corporate Crime at Kriptia International. His research interests, in line with Kriptia’s cultural and scientific mission, focus on the balance between historical analysis and contemporary geopolitical and strategic reflections, with particular attention to information analysis and its management in relation to corporate security dynamics. He is currently engaged in parallel research on the relationship between businesses and criminality, as well as on conceptual analogies between early modern ambassadors and the contemporary figure of the manager.